When Chinese President Xi Jinping meets with his Vietnamese counterpart, Nguyen Phu Trong, on Tuesday during his state visit to Vietnam, warm rhetoric can be expected, touting the deep-rooted camaraderie between the two communist nations. Last year, Trong was awarded China’s highest order given to a foreign dignitary during a visit to Beijing – during which Xi referred to their relationship as one of “comrades and brothers,” bragging that relations between the two countries were “as close as lips and teeth.”
Vietnam is likely to fall in behind Xi’s “Community of Common Destiny,” a vague concept that has taken on specific anti-US, global hegemony connotations – and has been seen as an attempt to reorder the current US-led world order. This would put China ahead of the US in their race for Vietnamese allegiance, only weeks after the US was elevated to the status of “Comprehensive Strategic Partner” during President Joe Biden’s visit to Hanoi in September. It places Washington at par with Beijing in the deftly balanced overseas partnerships of Vietnam.
During Xi’s visit, China will offer Vietnam advanced railway technology to help the Southeast Asian nation modernize its transport infrastructure. A new rail link connecting southern China to the Vietnamese port of Haiphong through an area rich in rare earth elements—the minerals crucial for electric vehicles and renewable energy production—would top the list. China dominates as the largest exporter and refiner of these minerals.
There will, however, be those topics which are too controversial or politically charged to make it onto the agenda. The two leaders will not discuss the simmering territorial row in the South China Sea nor dwell on the bitter relationship of the 1970s and 80s, including the 1979 border war which saw heavy casualties. Nor will they be talking about the historical colonization of Vietnam by China, known as “nghìn năm bắc thuộc” or 1,000 years of northern domination, nor Vietnam’s misgivings on the impact of Chinese dams on the Mekong River.
These issues, although not resolved, are very active on the internet in Vietnam, where little control is exercised over the internet, unlike in China. Some Vietnamese Facebook users wrote comments such as, “We only want peace, so President Xi, please don’t come,” and “If Xi Jinping removes the nine-dash line, the two countries can become brothers immediately,” referring to China’s expansive claims over the South China Sea.
Public sentiment in Vietnam can be strongly anti-Chinese, fueled by nationalism based on past successes against the French and Americans and deep-seated historic wariness of its northern neighbor. That has given way to episodic anti-Chinese demonstrations, including the 2014 riots that left people dead and property destroyed after China had moved an oil rig into disputed waters. More recently, shops began to spring up in Hanoi touting only Vietnamese products and excluding those from China.
Public tensions have been dampened as both governments have sought to avoid provocations like the 2014 oil rig incident. Nevertheless, the nine-dash line, known disparagingly in Vietnam as the “cow’s tongue,” remains a deep issue. This year, Vietnam banned the movie Barbie because it included what it said was a map showing the disputed Chinese claim. Vietnam’s reluctance to fully embrace China’s Belt and Road Initiative has been driven by concerns about possible backlash from Chinese investments.
Nevertheless, the economic influence of China still remains huge in Vietnam. It is Vietnam’s largest trading partner, with annual trade nearing $200 billion. In addition, it is also the top foreign direct investor in Vietnam, surpassing that of the US. This huge economic footprint comes despite Vietnam’s emerging as an alternate manufacturing hub for US firms trying to minimize dependence on China.
Although both states were based upon authoritarianism and a deep aversion to democratic values from the West, ideational affinity never completely faded. Xi Jinping’s China has risen with ambitions to challenge US-dominated global order and assume regional dominance, while Vietnam seeks to maximize benefits and security through a balancing act of relations amidst US-China rivalry but with historic ties to Russia.
Bamboo diplomacy, as represented by Nguyen Phu Trong, typifies the flexibility of foreign policy of Vietnam, built up since 1986 through four erected “Nos”: “no military alliances, no alignment with one power against another, no foreign military bases in the territory of Vietnam, and no use of force in international relations.” It is an approach that strives for friendly relations with all while avoiding antagonism.
Still, the recent upgrade in US-Vietnam relations serves as a strategic counterweight to Chinese influence. For Vietnam’s leadership, despite the historical and ongoing tensions, China is simply too important a partner. But the relationship is always at risk of being derailed through flare-ups in the South China Sea or some other perceived overreaches by China.
